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TITLE
ARE WE GIVING JUST 'LIP SERVICE' TO NIGHT TRAINING ?

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PREFACE

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I would be most remiss if I failed to acknowledge the two primary sources of assistance which made it possible for me to complete this paper. Foremost of these is my wife who, at great inconvenience to herself, kept the children quiet so that I could work. She also deserves high praise for so guarding the mass of papers and books attendant to the organization of this work that they were never lost, jumbled or destroyed by the children or by other agencies.

The other valuable source of assistance was the staff of the library of the Infantry School, and I hereby acknowledge with gratitude their help. Once I had occasion to look up some references on amphibious warfare. When I found that "Amphibious Warfare" references were filed under "Joint", and that the Dieppe Raid was filed under "Cross Channel", I realized that I was lost without trained librarian assistance. This assistance was always readily and efficiently rendered.

The combat examples used in this paper are amplified by sketches attached as Annexes. The reader will note that these annexes can be opened out and read concurrently with the text of the monograph itself. The sketches are based on ones found in references, but they have been corrected or made more detailed by comparison with U.S. Army maps of the area of operations. No sketches have been traced or copied directly.

The reader is hereby advised that the point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author and not necessarily that of the Infantry School or of the Department of the Army.

Douglas Penn Stickney, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

ATP 21-114, paragraph 13, states: "The Active Army will conduct at least one third of the applicatory stages of all tactical training and training in movements during the hours of darkness, stressing individual and unit night discipline". Do we of the Active Army adhere faithfully to this directive? In the immortal words and doubting inflection of George Gebel, "Sure we do".

We do. Any S-3 worth his salt can satisfy an inspector of training that he is complying with the ATP. But is he really complying? In some cases, possibly. But in many units the ATP is being interpreted in a sharp and super-legal manner that effectively reduces the intended amount of night training. Perhaps the wording of the ATP is at fault.

It reads "applicatory stages", for example. Who determines what these stages are? He who wishes to reduce night training has only to decide that they are few. He can take a block of six hours of the "Squad in the Attack" for example, and decide that of the six hours only two are "applicatory". He can decide that the rest should be spent in discussion, conference, lecture and demonstration; and therefore he needs schedule only one third of two hours after dark. The "Night Fighter" type of S-3, on the other hand, can decide that all six hours of such a problem are "applicatory" and schedule two hours after dark. Both have complied with the ATP.

The ATP reads "tactical training". Some S-3's believe that almost all training is tactical. They exclude only purely mechanical classes and TI&E, Character Guidance and the like. These S-3's will, logically enough, schedule much more of their training at night. Others may decide that "tactical training" is only that which involves units in purely tactical problems. These will also have complied with the ATP as written, but they will have scheduled

much less night training.

The third part of the ATP which leads away from night training is the expression "training in movements". To some this means only getting the troops loaded into trucks by night and having long columns of vehicles cross well-defined IP's in good order. I am inclined to believe that the writers of the ATP had very different ideas. I believe they meant that Squad Leaders should be trained to move their Squads by vehicle, snow-shoe, ski, foot, boat, raft and anything else by which troops can move, efficiently and accurately at night.

The reasons why some planners of training slight night training are obvious. Night training is a chore for all. It is much more difficult to conduct than daylight training and it leads to more headaches. Night training means that the troops must be kept out late at night and deprived of their passes, and the troops don't like this. It means that the unit officers, and even occasionally the staff officers, must be kept out late at night, which they don't like either. Night training must be laid on and planned with more care and thought and effort than daylight training because night problems are harder to control, to run and to evaluate. It means that far more concern and thought for safety must be exercised because there is more danger of accidents at night and no one wants more of those (aside from the humanitarian aspects, the reports are a pain in the neck). For all of these reasons, even officers who give "lip service" to the need for night training shy away from actually scheduling it.

Still another reason is that, for officers, night training means still longer hours than they already keep. This because all too few commanders actually give officers any compensatory time. All too often, "Open Time" or "Company Commander's Time" or "maintenance time" scheduled after night training are given only to the troops. The officers are required to use the time in catching up on administration, in holding boards and courts and in

attending meetings. The net result is that officers look with undisguised horror on night training. I believe that if more night training is scheduled, enough so that it becomes a habit, then even the less thoughtful commanders will eventually provide the officers with "compensatory" time. This will be true sooner, of course, if the aforementioned commanders attend themselves, some of this night training.

The reader will probably agree with my enumeration of the difficulties involved in scheduling night training. His question undoubtedly is, then, "All right, you have explained why night training is a pain in the neck and I agree. Why bother with it ?".

The reasons why we must "bother with" it are the theme of this paper. I intend to show why it is absolutely vital that we start truly training our troops in night fighting. I am convinced that we must become now more than ever an army of "night fighters". There is a tremendous amount to be gained by a great stress on night training. If I can influence just one commander or S-3 to that way of thinking then this monograph project will have been well worth the effort.

DISCUSSION

In his great World War II book "This Is Your War", Ernie Pyle says "One of my favorite anecdotes was about a soldier on guard duty in the front lines one night, for the first time. He heard a strange noise, fired at it, and then called out 'Who went there?' ". (12:286)

His soldier may not have been well trained in the manner of halting and challenging, but he had a real idea of the dangers inherent in the night. All of our soldiers should have this idea; both of the dangers to themselves in the dark and of the dangers they can make for the enemy in the dark.

During the summer of 1951 I served on a Division training committee and got the opportunity to run every Squad and every Platoon in the Division through two night problems which I set up and ran. I was a Lieutenant in the 18th Infantry Regiment in Germany. The training conditions were, I believe, ideal. The First Division was at that time, a stable organization comprised mostly of long term, Regular Army soldiers. The influx of draftees, many of them not there even long enough to complete a full training cycle, had not yet overtaken it. My two problems were "The Squad as a Night Recon Patrol" and "The Platoon in the Attack". I believe the training was very good. It was inspected so often that it should have been.

I noticed some interesting things during my entire summer of night training. We had a Ranger Company at that time, and in the patrol problem the Rangers were an interesting paradox. They were excellent troops; well trained individually and in fine physical condition. We expected them to do well. They didn't. Their orders were poor, their control was terrible and their cooperation between men was non-existent. Their patrols were carried out by nine separate men and not by well-coordinated small units. The Assistant Instructors were impressed by the individual work

done by the men. They crept and crawled and kept down. They made little noise. Each man looked over the assigned "enemy" area (as he felt like looking it over) and the Squads brought back, piecemeal, most of the desired information. Individually, these men were outstanding. As a unit, they were poor. The Aggressor detail caught one of the patrols and scattered it by machine gun fire. The patrol scattered and never got together again until all nine had returned separately to their starting point.

Some of the patrols from the rifle companies (there was a wide difference between companies, in spite of what is said about the limitations under which a Company Commander tries to train his own unit) were far better than the Rangers - in organizing the patrol. The best of the patrols carefully planned the operation. The Squad Leader would issue an excellent order; his planning was superb. The umpire listening to the preparations would expect a superlative job. Then the patrol would move out. The men would make as much noise as a herd of cattle. They would spread out until they were lost or they would cluster together until they were a compact little target. The Aggressor details would have no trouble in spotting them and raising hob with their patrols. Because of individual failures, the patrols would become ineffective; in spite of their fine pre-line-of-departure work.

One rifle company (happily from my regiment, but unfortunately not from my battalion) very nearly "maxed" my problem. They combined the excellent planning of the better patrol leaders with the excellent individual work of the Rangers. The Company Commander, I found out later, was responsible. Himself a firm believer in night work (and high test scores), he had trained and extolled and harangued his men until they were eager to do well and were capable of remembering all that they had learned in their previous training.

Unfortunately, this Company Commander had raised his men to an untenable fever pitch and by the time they reached my other problem, "The Platoon in the Night Attack", they were spent. They went through that problem like a bunch of very young Boy Scouts, doing as poor a job as any I had ever seen. But that problem of "over-training" (admittedly a minor problem in today's army) is another field of discussion.

For what the comment is worth, I might mention that the second best company through my patrol problem was one from the Division Engineers. They had an excellent Company Commander, and able officers, but the main reason for their success was the admitted fact that all of this night Infantry work was new and fascinating to them and they worked at it with the eagerness of children with a new and fascinating toy.

Another gratis comment that I might throw in here, 'though I am wandering from my subject, is the one that my sub-committee that ran these two night problems was under the "Special Operations Committee". It doesn't really matter what you call the committees of a training group, but I think it is significant when perfectly routine night training activities are classified as "special operations".

Today there are many units that are well trained in neither individuals nor in units, but the point to remember is that the men must be trained as individual soldiers and as unit teams. Discipline and esprit are large factors also. Obviously, the ideal solution is to have well-disciplined units with high esprit de corps, not stale from over-training, in which the individual soldiers and the fighting teams are well trained in all forms of night operations. This is a big order, but it is the ultimate goal toward which we all must strive.

* The Korean War is perhaps the best example of the reason why we must carry out this night training business in earnest. There are countless examples of night fighting, both good and bad on our part, in that three year unpleasantness. The enemy we fought there fought mostly at night and frequently fought very well at night. We can conclude that the enemy was trained in Russian ideas and techniques, so we can further conclude that the Russians favor night operations also. From our experience in Korea it becomes obvious that we must be able to fight at night if only because the enemy will. If anyone requires further proof of Russian interest in night fighting, I note the following comment from a Soviet military journal (speaking about World War II): "Night has always been the true ally of bold and skillful warriors. In conditions of the present war the role of night operations has grown especially. The fire power of the defense and the abundance of varied combat materiel now limit the success of day combat". (14:89)

"But", you may say, "The Korean War does not necessarily indicate that the enemy will want to fight at night. We forced him to fight us at night by our preponderance of artillery and air support." Very well, let us assume that he did so only because by day our artillery and air were too much for him. As the world military picture shows itself today, who, in the next war, is likely to be the holder of preponderant artillery and air forces; we or our enemies? The answer is, I believe, obvious. In any future war it may well be we who suffer from enemy artillery and air superiority. It may well, then, be we who are forced to fight at night because enemy air and artillery will clobber us by day. The shoe may well be on the other foot next time; and if it is we had best be prepared to make the most of the protective cloak of darkness.

Field Manual 7-20 lists several good reasons for conducting night operations. All of these may, from time to time, dictate that we choose to operate at night. The one which is sure, I believe, to dominate our thinking when the next war comes along is the one which states that one purpose of a night attack is " To avoid heavy losses that would be incurred by daylight " (4:201) . This because any way in which you look at the situation today, I don't believe you can find a potential situation for tomorrow in which our enemies will not outnumber us. We will be vastly outnumbered in all probability, and there will be greater stress than ever on reducing casualties. Hence - night operations. I do not mean by the foregoing that the U.S. Army has ever advocated taking many casualties. In the past, however, we have occasionally taken those casualties in exchange for a particularly desired objective. Outnumbered as we will undoubtedly be the next time, I do not believe we will have the choice.

Manpower is our greatest lack, and saving lives is our heaviest concern; so any procedure that will save manpower is the procedure that we must use.

There is one other cogent reason for our stressing night operations. It is reason enough to make night training essential even if there were no other reasons. This reason is neatly drawn out in a small pamphlet issued by Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen to the officers of the 104th Infantry Division in World War II. General Allen was a wholehearted believer in night operations and made his Division extremely capable in them. (Both his Divisions, actually. The 1st Infantry Division, which he commanded through the North African and Sicilian Campaigns, was also very efficient at night (12:286). At the end of his little pamphlet

General Allen says " The skillful use of night attacks indicates smart, aggressive leadership. Night attacks will frequently gain difficult limited objectives with comparatively few casualties. Attacking troops must be highly trained and imbued with a determination to close with the enemy and destroy him with the bayonet ". (3:6)

Successful night operations do indicate something. General Allen says it is "smart, aggressive leadership". It is even more than that. If you have troops and small unit leaders who are capable of operating successfully at night, what can you conclude about them? You know that your men have conquered the perfectly natural fear of the unknown (the dark) that is common to us all; at least enough to be able and willing to operate in it. If your leaders can navigate at night and can control their units at night, when the problems of movement and control are most magnified, then you can be reasonably sure that your Squad Leaders are capable of controlling their men and moving them at any time. Good night fighters have learned how to move when movement is most difficult (including all of movement's problems: walking and running, map reading, location of position, compass reading, identification and many others). They have learned that to get information or to make contact with the enemy they must move in close to, or within, that enemy's position. All of these things are what the good night fighter knows and can do. Are these talents and this knowledge useful only at night? Obviously not. If a Squad Leader can control and move a Squad by night, then it is logical to assume that he can control and move it even better in the daylight. For no other reason than this, then, it might be a good idea to do our training at night. If the men can do well at night they can do even better in the daytime; and if our troops are imbued with the need for closing with the enemy, they will have the necessary aggressiveness to close with and destroy him - day or night.

Is the converse of this true? If a Squad Leader can expertly control his Squad by daylight, can we conclude that he will also be able to do so at night? Unfortunately - no.

If we stress night fighting and make our soldiers able and willing to fight at night, we will have prepared them for what they will probably be required to do in the next war. If none of our soldiers ever fights again at night we will have lost nothing by this emphasis (except maybe a little sleep). The skills a soldier learns in becoming a skilled night fighter only make him yet more qualified in daylight fighting.

All of us will someday be in a position to schedule training at one level or another. Instead of ducking night training, let's increase it. It may even mean that we will have some time off during the day; something that many of us have never known.

There is extant a book on training called "Realistic Combat Training and How To Conduct It" by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg. His theme is not night training alone, but on this subject he says "The night is not for rest. For the aggressive, darkness is a shield and armor; for the timid, the lazy and the uncautious, it is quicksand. There is no finer training hour or period for the development of individual and small unit spirit and confidence. Night is the time to teach men to capitalize on enemy areas just behind, or deep into hostile lines. This is the age of helicopter patrols, the twilight launched and landed men who can make the safest rear area unsafe. Soldier confidence is built when you give him practice in overcoming the uncertainties of darkness. Make sure your men - whatever the type unit - learn to operate in darkness, not just stand or wallow around". (13:51)

Let us consider some examples of night fighting to note the things we must stress in training. Combat examples cannot prove that we must stress night training; nor can they prove that we are either very bad or very good in night fighting. I could pick three examples of terrible night work or I could pick three excellent ones, and neither would prove anything. I have chosen one good one and one bad one from Korea and one good one from World War II. They are of interest in guiding our thinking about this problem, but of no particular value in proving or disproving anything.

Sketches 1, 2 and 3 show the dispositions of Companies K and L of the 9th Infantry Regiment on the night of 25 November 1950. The reader will note (from Sketch 2) that K and L are too far apart for mutual support. The reader will also notice that both Companies are well forward of Battalion, which is about half a mile to the left rear of Company L. The reader will conclude that these are poor dispositions from which to fight the Chinese Communist Army as it sweeps down from the north in a "new war". The dispositions are poor for such a purpose; but the troops were only vaguely aware that such a purpose need ever be considered. The 9th Infantry Regiment was advancing rapidly against the crumbling North Korean Army and such isolated dispositions were sufficient to ward off any attacks by disorganized North Korean groups. No one was particularly concerned. The dispositions were not good but they were good enough for what they had been facing. They were not good enough for what they were about to face, but the lack of intelligence information which caused the error is beyond the scope of this paper ('way beyend !).

Actually, the dispositions as shown here are far worse, even, than they appear to be; and some of the reasons have to do with the concern of this paper - training. Both Companies were vastly understrength. That has nothing to do with training. Although they were on ridges 2500 yards apart, the two Companies thought that they were in supporting distance of each other. This is a great criticism of the training of both. Neither one sent out patrols to find the other, so throughout the night neither knew where the other was. They could not communicate with each other, either; their radios would not reach and they did not bother to string wire. The only reasons the researcher can find possibly to explain these deficiencies are that no one had any idea of the enormity of the impending Chinese Communist attack and that the men of both Companies were extremely tired from hard marching over very rugged terrain all day.

Battalion Headquarters showed itself to be equally misled or ill-trained. They were in communications with neither Company. Again, radios would not reach. Battalion tried sending out wire to K Company. A Sergeant went out with it and, apparently too tired to climb the ridges to the forward positions he followed the twists and turns of the low ground. He ran out of wire about two-thirds of the way out. No one either at Battalion or at the Company bothered to do anything about this and wire communications remained nil.

The reader will note that Company K had a machine gun posted on its left flank to cover the broad, flat stream bed which ran around the foot of their position. The gunner of this weapon and several riflemen were down there watching. The reader will also note that the Company has gone into position around the lower of two little peaks. The peak on the right is about fifty feet higher than the one on the left. The troops actually

dug in on even lower ground, not even making sure of the little peak. This ignoring of the high ground can again be explained by the lack of concern for the enemy and also by the tiredness of the troops - digging was easier in the lower ground.

Before we consider the conduct of this disaster it might be well to note that no units of the Eighth Army are in front of Company K. When the CCF arrives, Company K will be the first to know.

The action opened in the creek bed covered by the machine gun. Specifically, a whole Chinese Regiment passed through the creek bed about forty yards from the machine gun. The gunner did not open fire, nor did he attempt to get word back to the CP about the enemy. Finally, when the last of the column passed, one of the riflemen down there opened fire and then ran back up the hill. The machine gunner then figured it was time to fire and did so. His gun fired a few rounds and then quit. The Chinese hit the ground. The gunner worked the bolt and fired a few more rounds, but then the gun quit again and the Chinese got up and moved toward him. The gunner got up, left the gun and ran up the hill to rejoin the 3rd Platoon. None of this speaks well for the somewhat casual manner in which these men faced an enemy regiment. None of it speaks particularly well for the training of the machine gunner or of the riflemen. When these men reached the 3rd Platoon, none of them bothered to tell the Platoon Leader what they had seen. This added to the general belief of the Company that this whole affair was one of a small group of the enemy such as they had often beaten off as the defeated enemy streamed north.

The 2nd Platoon had fired on some of the enemy, as had the machine gun, and all of Company K was falling back to regroup around the little peak where they should have been in the first place. It was while they were falling back that the main Chinese attack struck. The enemy attack

was made apparently by about two enemy Companies who broke off from the main body and attacked from the rear. The rest of the Chinese Regiment continued on its way into L Company's position and thence into the rear areas. The aforementioned lack of communications meant that each position hit by the Chinese was surprised just as much as K Company had been; and this includes most of the elements of the Eighth Army.

K Company disintegrated as the Chinese attacked. They withdrew as shown on the sketch and the few survivors eventually arrived back in our lines after varying degrees of individual hardship. Some individuals fought well in this rugged time and some fought badly or not at all. The officers did what they could and several Non-Coms are also mentioned in various accounts for trying to bring some order out of the chaos. Perhaps I am unjust in blaming this mess on the training of Company K and perhaps the more charitable view would be to stress the fact that no one knew about the CCF entry into the war. Many years from now, history will record more accurately the facts of the situation, but I believe that even now officers concerned with troop training should study situations like this one to see that the chance of recurrence is at an irreducible minimum.

The story of Company L in this matter is similar. The Company had built bonfires because of the cold and as the CCF Regiment passed beyond Company K's positions, it clearly saw the outlines of Company L's. Of course, L Company knew nothing of what had happened to Company K, and Battalion had no idea what was happening to either. The only difference in the CCF attack on L Company was that they did not attack blowing bugles and playing shepherd's pipes. They didn't have to. Those tricks were to draw fire to gain an idea of our dispositions. In this situation, L Company's dispositions were clear in the firelight.

Some of the men and officers of Company L fought valiantly, if to no great purpose. As if their troubles already outlined were not enough, they also suffered from a lack of ammunition, particularly mortar ammunition and grenades. They were to be resupplied, but their party bringing up the resupply was driven off when it stumbled into some of the Chinese attacking the position. It was a rather sorry effort and resulted in no resupply at all for Company L.

Getting back to the communications situation (which would have been corrected by some conscientious and well-trained Communications people and properly concerned officers and Non-Coms), it is well here to note that word of this defeat of K and L Companies did not reach Battalion until stragglers from K Company reached there early the next morning. By then the enemy was well into the Regiment's rear. (The foregoing account is from 10:56 amplified in part from 11)

Another example of night fighting in Korea was the defense of "Million Dollar Hill" by Company K of the 5th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, on the night of 4 August 1951. This defense is unusual in no particular regard. It went off in exactly the way a defense should come off. Everything worked magnificently and it went just as the "book" says it should.

The Company was arranged in a tight perimeter around the three knobs shown on the sketch (Sketch #4). The enemy held the last little knob and the ridge next to "Million Dollar Hill". 3rd Battalion had taken the hill in an attack two days before (it was part of the limited objective series of attacks being made all along the almost stable front). King spent all of the day securing their defense. We need not go into detail about how they did it. Their training was apparently excellent. They left nothing to

chance and they were perfectly prepared for whatever the night might bring. They had spent the day digging foxholes deep, by order of the Company Commander. They had arranged trip flares and other warning devices around their area. All day Korean carrying parties brought up ammunition, grenades and other supplies. The Company was being supported by two batteries of 105's, two batteries of 155's and two Companies of 4.2's in addition to the organic weapons of the Company and the Battalion. The forward observers and the Company Commander spent the day planning and registering the fires of all these weapons. Nothing was left to chance; just as the "book" says nothing should be left to chance.

The only deviation (other than deviation inherent in Korean "hogback ridge" terrain) made by the Company Commander from accepted common defense teachings was to establish a reserve Squad of eight men which he personally controlled. These men were to remain near the CP. When the Company Commander thought they were needed somewhere to plug a hole or a gap in the lines or to reinforce the defense somewhere, he had them on hand to rush up. This is not a startling innovation, but it might be an idea worthy of further thought by people concerned with teaching small unit defensive tactics. After-action interviews indicated that the men of the Company were reassured in knowing that support was available to them if needed.

(5:205)

The Chinese attacked in considerable strength up the ridgeline from the little knoll which they controlled. They attacked hardest against the 2nd Platoon which was holding the eastern end of the perimeter. The Chinese attacked first by throwing in waves of hand grenades. No great damage was done and the attack was beaten off initially by a Sergeant and two men who climbed to the top of a little rock outcropping and themselves dropped grenades into the attackers. The ridge was so steep that it was easy to roll

grenades into the enemy. The attack died down and there was a lull for about half an hour.

An enemy soldier sneaked up alone against the 2nd Platoon's machine gun and fired at it with a flare gun which illuminated the front of the emplacement. The gunner picked the gun off its tripod and, firing "Hollywood Style" from the hip, poured enough fire into the Chinese to keep them from taking advantage of the illumination. Another enemy soldier finally wounded the gunner with a grenade. At that point the enemy attack reached its greatest violence of the night and several of the machine gunners and men protecting the machine gun were wounded. Realizing the criticality of the gun, the Sergeant mentioned earlier leapt down and manned the gun. He then yelled back to have the eight man reserve squad rushed down to his position. The initial Chinese grenade assault had broken the sound power telephone line from the Platoon to the Company, but eager hands had fixed it and the call got through.

The eight men reached the position and kept up the volume of fire in that sector. The whole perimeter was blazing by this time but no one, apparently, got particularly excited. Mortar fire was increased as the eight man reserve squad moved into position; to cover their move. Everything went exactly as planned. The 2nd Platoon was most heavily engaged and hence was lowest on ammunition. A Non-Com immediately brought a resupply by taking it from the less heavily engaged 1st and 3rd Platoons. The 2nd Platoon Machine Gun went out from being fired too much and it was rapidly replaced by the gun belonging to the 3rd.

Ammunition was running low and the Company Commander asked Battalion for a resupply. It would take a few minutes to get it up, so the order went out to conserve ammunition. The enemy assault died down again at

about 0100. The Korean ammunition carrying parties, however, had been fired on and were unwilling to climb the hill. Ammunition would be a problem. The Company waited two hours for ammunition and none came up. The men began to show signs of worry so, confidently, the Company Commander said "We'll just wrestle 'em when we run out of ammunition" (5:208). Morale continued high.

To cover the embarrassing shortage of ammunition the Company Commander called for artillery and mortar fire on the still-continuing enemy fire from the adjacent ridges. The artillery and the mortars fired continually for an hour and a half until daylight came and the enemy fire ceased.

Unfortunately, the Company was withdrawn from the hill the next day. It had been taken in a limited objective attack just to keep the enemy off balance and Eighth Army did not want it held. K Company hated to leave, but they did so with considerable pride. They counted 46 enemy dead around their perimeter and figured they had killed and wounded many more. K Company's casualties numbered 5 wounded and none killed or missing.

This example is a pleasant one to write about because it went so exactly according to plan and to good tactical doctrine. It indicates excellent training at all echelons and perhaps even more than that, it indicates discipline and control unfortunately not common. It was, admittedly, a luxurious defense in view of the vast supporting fires; but it is worthy of study because, ideally, these things should be available to the defense. (This account is from 5:201).

The third example seems to be a favorite of the Infantry School; probably because of the unusual boundaries prescribed by Regiment (see Sketch #5). The Advanced Course discussed a very much modified version of this example in class; with units disguised so as to be unidentifiable. I believe it was unnecessary to conceal the units involved; they certainly had little to be ashamed of.

On the 2nd of December 1944, the 104th (Timberwolf) Division had reached the Inde River in their drive through the Ruhr and into the heart of Germany. This was General Terry Allen's Division and was particularly well-trained in night operations, as was previously noted. In this action the 415th Infantry Regiment moved out in a night attack against a built up industrial area. As such things are categorized, this is about as much a "Special Operation" as an operation can get. It was a night attack across a river, with a built up area for its objective. Sketch #5 shows how the operation was carried out.

A large artillery preparation was fired for one hour prior to H-Hour which was 2300 on 2 December. This artillery undoubtedly helped, but it did not silence German artillery or dent the German defenses. German artillery was dangerous throughout the night. At H-Hour, 2nd Battalion crossed the Inde River with two Companies abreast; G Company on the north and E Company on the south. These two moved in and took objectives B and C as shown on the sketch. Company F crossed the river thereafter and moved south around objective C and into the eastern portion of objective B. Note that Company F is now in position to assist in the attack on the town of Lucherburg which is the Regiment's final objective for the night.

3rd Battalion moved out in a column of Companies. Company L, the reserve Company, sent out a reinforced platoon first, which planked the railroad bridge across the Inde River just south of Inden. This platoon then pulled back, under enemy fire, into the factory buildings of the town of Inden. Company I then crossed over on the bridge, under considerable enemy artillery fire, and reached the railroad tracks. Here they were halted

by strong enemy fire and the Company Commander realized that all hope of surprise was now lost. He got most of his men up and they just made a dash through the fire for the town. One of his platoons, with some attached mortars, did become lost during the dash and did miss the early part of the street fighting, but this was of no great consequence, they did arrive in time to help and this was the only thing that might be called an error in the night's fighting.

The fight for Lucherburg was a tough one, and it was I Company's alone, since L Company was unable to follow them through the fire into the town. While I Company spent the night in holding a precarious toehold in the town, L Company was pulled south along the friendly side of the river. It crossed the river at Lamersdorf and moved along the battalion boundary to objective B. There it joined Company F, and the two companies together joined Company I the following day to secure the town of Lucherburg.

The foregoing is, in condensed form, what happened. To make it happen considerable discipline, training and courage was displayed. We will first consider the operations of the 2nd Battalion. G Company was to lead off by crossing the river at 2300 - H-Hour. The Company Commander noted that the enemy fire was considerable and was well planned to sweep the open ground across which the Company had to move. Consequently, he moved G Company across the river before H-Hour, while his own artillery was still falling. He wanted to be in position to jump the enemy immediately on the lifting of the artillery. He wanted no time lag between the last artillery round and the first hand grenade; and his men followed him right into the artillery fire. The Inden River was icy and so was the weather. The men had to wade through ice water under fire. The water was supposed to be only about

two feet deep, but the Germans had burst some dams in the north and the water in many places was chest deep. No difficulty is recorded in moving the Company across, immediately behind the artillery fire; an excellent indication of discipline, training and confidence in the artillery. The Company moved against the enemy with rifles unloaded ! The theory was that identification would be facilitated if our troops used hand grenades and bayonets only. Any rifle fire would have to be enemy. This seems a pretty good idea - if you can get your troops to "buy" it. These did. That such orders could be given speaks well for discipline and training; their success says still more.

G Company, then, crossed the river before H-Hour and moved close behind their artillery fire into the flat, open fields that the Germans were covering by fire. A rifleman noted, while the shells were still coming in, two enemy weapons emplacements, concrete bunkers. When the last shell landed this rifleman, operating on his own initiative, threw two hand grenades into one bunker and one into the other. The two Germans in the first were killed while the two in the other were wounded and surrendered immediately. It was found later that the guns in these bunkers were laid to provide grazing fire that would have decimated the Company as it moved on. The grenades had arrived just as the Germans were in the act of manning the guns. Because the Infantry was so close behind their artillery fire, the Germans never had a chance to fire what would have been a nasty bit of grazing fire. The Company entered the town that was objective B and took it with relative ease since they had capitalized so neatly on the surprise appearance of the Infantry.

Company E, on the south against objective C, moved out under its share of the artillery preparation and had its objective secured by 2345; 45 minutes after H-Hour. They caught the enemy by surprise and took prisoner the enemy troops that were there. E Company's CP moved into a chateau which had been used for the same purpose by the Germans. They captured two more Germans who walked right into it, not knowing that it had changed hands.

In the 3rd Battalion it was all I Company. Their Company Commander led them personally in a straight run up the hill on which Lucherburg is situated. An enemy tank gave them some pause but a bazooka team came up and drove it off with three rounds (poor shooting, perhaps, but commendable effort). There followed some excellent street fighting made particularly memorable by the actions of the Company Commander, who got a DSC for his work (Posthumous, unfortunately. He was killed at about 0200).

At dawn a truce was arranged in Lucherburg between a German doctor and one of the Lieutenants of I Company. The truce was repudiated by an irate German infantry commander whose men grabbed the American Lieutenant and held him as a hostage. A Sergeant grabbed the German doctor to exchange later for the Lieutenant. This is not an example of training, perhaps, but I think it shows considerable presence of mind.

After the truce the enemy counterattacked violently. A Platoon Leader assumed command of the Company and he and the artillery FO stopped the attack by calling for mortar and artillery fire on their own position. The men stood this well and continued to fire from basement windows. The Company later had the pleasure of mopping up when Companies L and F consolidated the town by their attack from the west (from objective B). Company I policed up 200 enemy dead; they had 16st 25 of their own men.

With proper training and discipline, when led by leaders of the "right thinking" sort, our troops apparently can fight at night against the best troops we have ever faced, and beat them decisively. There must be more examples of this sort and none of the other.

CONCLUSION

1. Present training directives for night training make ample provision for night training but are subverted by various individual interpretations which frequently defeat them.
2. Night training must be increased and stressed.
3. Night training can and should be scheduled in such a manner that it does not work a hardship on any personnel undergoing or conducting it.
4. Future ground fighting will include even more night fighting than there has been in the past.
5. Our own limitations will force us to emphasize night operations in future ground fighting.
6. Night training does not contradict or work against day training; on the contrary it supplements it and adds to it.
7. Night training must include both individual training and unit training. Individual training does not train units and unit training does not train individuals.
8. American soldiers have shown that they are capable of fighting well at night. There is no reason to believe that any potential enemy will have an undue advantage over us if we train our troops properly for night operations.
9. Night operations should not, even just for convenient classification, be considered "Special Operations".

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
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ANNEX A (Sketches)

1. Sketch Number 1 - Positions of Company K, 9th Infantry Regiment, 25 November 1950.
2. Sketch Number 2 - Schematic sketch of relative positions of Companies K and L, 9th Infantry Regiment, 25 November 1950.
3. Sketch Number 3 - Positions of Company L, 9th Infantry Regiment, 25 November 1950.
4. Sketch Number 4 - "Million Dollar Hill". Positions of Company K, 5th Infantry Regiment, 4 August 1951.
5. Sketch Number 5 - Night attack on Lucherburg, Germany, by 415th Infantry Regiment, 2 December 1944.

Sketch #1
I# dots 2



—|— = 100 yards

Contour lines show
shape and steepness
only, not actual elevation

Co. K, 9th Inf Regt
Night of
25 June 1950

Sketch #2
Sketch #1

K 9

dry creek bed

2500
yds


3rd Bn, 9th Inf Regt
Schematic sketch
showing relative
positions of Co's.
This sketch omits
considerable detail.
It is intended only
to show distances
between units.


L 9

2800
yds


To I 9 and 3 9

Chorashon River






Sketch #1
dots 2



—|— = 100 yards
Contour lines show
shape and steepness
only, not actual elevation

Co K, 5th Inf Regt
Night of
4 August 1951



LD is Inde River.
 H-Hour is 2300.
 Co's Land F are
 reserve Companies
 of their Battalions.
 Moves shown were
 made after H-Hour.

Sketch
 Showing night attack
 on Lucherburg, German
 by 2nd and 3rd Battalions
 of the 415th
 Infantry Regiment,
 2 Dec 1944